Finding a balance between privacy and utility, allowing researchers and businesses to use data for good while protecting people's privacy, is one of the biggest challenge we face today. A large body of research has shown the limits of the traditional anonymization (or de-identi cation) model prompting the use of question and answer or query-based systems. Di x is a query-based system developed by Aircloak using the concept of "sticky noise" to protect people's privacy. We here present an attack on Di x that exploits the structure of its sticky noise to infer private attributes of people in the dataset. We believe this vulnerability to be serious, allowing us to accurately infer private information of users with little background knowledge. While we share Di x's creators view that we need to take a fresh look at building practical privacy-preserving systems, we believe this requires a layered security approach and fully open tools and discussions. Patented and proprietary code is unlikely to be su cient to truly help us nd a balance between the great potential of data and the basic human right of privacy.
Introduction
Data has the potential to fundamentally transform the way we ght diseases, design cities, or perform research. Scientists have compared modern large-scale datasets to the invention of the microscope [1] and this data has generated similar excitement in organizations and governments. However, the collection and use of this data raises privacy concerns as it often contains ne-grained and potentially sensitive information about individuals.
Historically, the balance between using the data and preserving people's privacy has relied, both practically and legally, on the concept of data anonymization. A large body of research has however shown data anonymization or de-identi cation to not be robust to simple re-identi cation attacks [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . President [Obama] 's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology recently concluded that anonymization "is not robust against near-term future re-identi cation methods. PCAST do not see it as being a useful basis for policy" [7] .
This led privacy researchers and companies to investigate the use of query-based [8] or question and answer [9] systems to allow users to fully use individual-level data, in aggregate, while protecting people's privacy. Such system provides data analysts with an interface allowing them to ask questions and obtain aggregate results back. Uber's FLEX [10] and Mastercard Retail Location Insights [11] are examples of limited query-based systems.
Researchers a liated with Aircloak and MPI-SWS have recently proposed a new general privacy-preserving mechanism for query-based systems called Di x [12, 13] . Di x relies on a novel noise addition framework called "sticky noise" which aims to give analysts a rich query syntax, minimal noise addition, and an in nite number of queries, all while fully protecting people's privacy. Aircloak claims that Di x (1) falls outside of the scope of the GDPR, (2) has been determined by CNIL to o er "GDPRlevel anonymization" for all cases, and (3) has been certi ed by TÜViT as ful lling "all requirements for data collection and anonymized reporting" [14] .
We here present an attack on Di x that exploits the structure of its sticky noise to infer private attributes of people in the dataset. Our attack, which we call a noiseexploitation attack, is threefold. First, we cancel out part of the sticky noise using multiple queries. Second, we exploit the fact that the noise Di x adds leaks information about the query set. Third, we use logical equivalence between queries to obtain independent noise samples. We believe this attack to be very powerful. In a simple experiment, we show that knowing 5 attributes (auxiliary information) allows us to infer private information of users with up to 99% accuracy.
Summary of the Di x framework
We here summarize the Di x framework as described in [13] and introduce notations for our attack. Di x acts as an SQL proxy between an analyst and a protected database D where each row is an individual record and each column one attribute. The analyst can send SQL queries to Di x, which will process the queries and then output a noisy answer.
We denote with A D the set of attributes in the database D. For instance, A D could contain 4 attributes A D = {gender, age, zipcode, HIV} with HIV a binary attribute (0 or 1). A record x is a row of D with values for the attributes in A D . For example, with A D as above, we could have x = (M, 27, 55416, 1). We assume, for simplicity, that there is one and only one record for every user in D.
While Di x can process a large part of the SQL syntax, we here focus on simple count queries: where every condition is an expression of the form "a ribute value" and can be =, , ≤, <, ≥, or >.
For simplicity, we use a shorter notation for queries using "∧" for the logical AND:
The following query would, for example, count the number of individuals in the database who are male, 37 years old, and live in the area with ZIP code 48828:
Di x's privacy-preserving mechanism
Di x protects privacy through sticky noise addition (static and dynamic noise) and bucket suppression. Let Q ≡ count(C 1 ∧ . . . ∧ C h ), and denote by Q(D) the true result of Q evaluated on D (without noise). Di x's output for Q on D (without bucket suppression, see below) is:
with static[C i ] the static noise for condition
Static noise Let C be a condition, for example "age=34". The static noise static[C] associated to C is a random number drawn from a normal distribution N (0, 1). The value is generated by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), whose seed is a salted hash of the string literal C:
This ensures that the static noise associated with C is always the same independently of the query where C appears. The noise is "sticky" thereby preventing an attacker to send the same query multiple times and averaging the results to obtain a precise estimate of the private value (averaging attack).
Dynamic noise
In Di x every record in D is associated with a user ID, a unique string for that user. These pseudonyms are used to compute the dynamic noise. Let Q ≡ count(C 1 ∧ . . . ∧ C h ) be a query and C any condition C i . The dynamic noise depends not only on C, but also on the query set of Q in the dataset D, i.e. the set of users which satis es all conditions C 1 , . . . , C h . More precisely, if the query set for Q on D is S = {uid 1 , uid 2 , . . . , uid m }, the dynamic noise for C (dynamic Q [C]) is generated from a normal distribution N (0, 1) by the PRNG seeded with:
Note that we don't include D in the notation dynamic Q [C], as the dataset is usually xed and clear from the context.
The output Q(D) is therefore the realization of a random variable distributed as a normal distribution N (µ, σ 2 ), with mean µ = Q(D) and variance σ 2 = 2h.
Consider again the query
Where Q(D) is a random value drawn from a normal distribution N (Q(D), 6).
Static and dynamic noise layers are both needed to prevent intersection attacks such as the ones presented in the Di x papers [12, 13] .
Bucket suppression In addition to static and dynamic noise, Di x implements another security measure called bucket suppression. Di x's bucket suppression is similar to the classic query set size restriction: if the size of the query set is smaller than a certain threshold, the query is rejected. Previous research has shown that a xed threshold constitutes a risk for privacy [15] . Di x addresses this issue by using a noisy threshold, which is sticky to the query set. Speci cally, suppose Di x processes a query If Q(D) < T , the query is suppressed; otherwise, the noisy output Q(D) is computed and sent to the analyst. Di x's white papers state that queries are "silently suppressed" when censored by bucket suppression (when a query is censored, an analyst e.g. receives 0 or an error message back).
Noise-exploitation attack
Our noise-exploitation attack is based on three observations. First, since the noise is sticky it is possible to cancel out part of it using multiple queries. Second, if the noise depends on the query set, the noise itself leaks information about the query set. Third, exploiting logical equivalence of some queries, it is possible to circumvent the "stickiness" of the noise by repeating (almost) the same query and consequently obtain independent noise samples.
We rst de ne further notations: with A ⊆ A D a set of attributes, x (A) is the restriction of the record x to A, i.e. the vector one obtains after removing from x every entry for attributes that are not in A. For example, if A D = {gender, age, zipcode, HIV}, x = (M, 27, 55416, 1) and A = {gender, age, HIV}, then x (A) = (M, 27, 1). If A contains a single attribute a, we simply write x (a) . So, for example, x (gender) = M.
Our attacker wants to nd sensitive information (s) about Bob, the victim, which the attacker knows to be in the dataset. We call s the target attribute. Denoting x as Bob's record, the secret we want to nd out is x (s) . Our attack makes the following assumptions:
H1 The attacker knows all of Bob's attributes for some set of attributes A, where s A. Our background knowledge (also called auxiliary information in the literature) is the restricted record x (A) .
H2 For simplicity, s is a binary attribute. Hence, x (s) ∈ {0, 1}. While we here focus on the binary case, our results extend fairly easily to non-binary cases.
H3 The restricted record x (A) is unique in D. That is, there is no other record such that x (A) = (A) . This means that Bob is uniquely identi ed by the attributes in A.
For our attacks to succeed, we rst need to bypass Bucket suppression. For example, an attacker could ask how many records have both the background knowledge x (A) and the sensitive attribute, s = 0:
with A = {a 1 , . . . , a k −1 } and
While an accurate answer to Q would immediately disclose the value of x (s) , since Q(D) can be either 0 (if x (s) = 1) or 1 (if x (s) = 0), this query will always be blocked by bucket suppression since the query set is either empty or {Bob}.
Intersection attacks have been proposed in the literature to circumvent similar kinds of restrictions [16] . Picking an attribute, e.g. a 1 , we can de ne the following queries:
which allow us to directly Q(D):
To prevent this 1 Di x adds static and dynamic noises:
and
The rst part of our attack relies on noticing that k − 2 static noise layers cancel out:
leaving us with k noise layers:
The second part of our attack relies the fact that both dynamic Q 1 [a i = x i ] and dynamic Q 2 [a i = x i ] relate to the same condition "a i = x i " or "s = 0". This means that the noise of Q1 and Q2 will cancel out if Q1 and Q2 have the same query set. Therefore either Q1(D) − Q2(D) = 0 and the k − 2 dynamic noise layers cancel out or Q1(D) − Q2(D) = 1 and no dynamic noise layer is canceled out:
Using this result, an attacker can run a likelihood ratio test to estimate whether 2k) and estimate the value of x (s) . The larger k is, the easier it becomes to discriminate between the two distributions. This alone already allow us to make a better than random guess on what Bob's secret, x (s) , is.
The third part of our attack allows us to strongly improve the accuracy of our guess. While the stickiness of the noise prevents us from running the same query again to collect more sample, we circumvent it by using di erent pairs of queries (Q1, Q2) for which equation (6) is still true. For instance, instead of removing (resp. negating) the condition a 1 = x 1 , we can remove (resp. negate) other conditions a j = x j for j ≤ k − 1. While (6) is still true, the queries are di erent. This allows us to get di erent noises and therefore new samples to estimate the value of Q(D). Repeating this for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 we obtain k − 1 samples. Repeating the whole procedure replacing the "s = 0" condition with "s = 1" in Q1 and Q2 allows us to obtain k − 1 more samples (with di erent noises and inverted results in equation (6)). This gives us a total of 2k −2 samples before bucket suppression (see section 4).
Example Going back to our dataset D containing the attributes age, zipcode, and HIV, we suppose we are given a restricted record x \ x (HIV) for which x (age) = 37 and x (zipcode) = 48828. As before, we assume that Bob is the only user with both age=37 and zipcode=48828. Using the same notation as before where x (HIV) is the HIV value of Bob's record x, we have Q ≡ count(age=37 ∧ zipcode=48828 ∧ HIV=0).
which will be 0 if Bob has HIV, and 1 if Bob does not have HIV. To circumvent the bucket suppression, we de ne two queries for the intersection attack. For the rst pair of queries, we remove/negate the age condition:
Based on the previous ndings, we know that
if Bob does not have HIV (7) Q1(D) − Q2(D) is a rst sample for our likelihood ratio test. Repeating the same procedure with the zipcode attribute gives us:
where Q3(D) − Q4(D) is again distributed as N (0, 2) if Bob has HIV, and as N (1, 4) otherwise. This is our second sample. Repeating the procedure de ning Q1 , Q2 , Q3 , and Q4 in the same way and replacing "HIV=0" with "HIV=1" (and inverting the results), we obtain two more samples giving us the expected total of 4 samples.
Empirical quanti cation of the accuracy of the attack We numerically estimate the accuracy yielded by our attack as a function of the numbers of known attributes. For each value of k, we sample 2k −2 independent values from either N (0, 2) or N (1, 2k) and try to identify the original distribution using the likelihood ratio test. We repeated each experiment several times and assume balanced truth values (uniform prior). We estimate the accuracy by repeating the test on one sample (δ 1 , . . . , δ k−1 , η 1 , . . . , η k −1 ) (see Appendix). Fig. 1 shows that the accuracy of our attacks increases steeply with k and already reaches 99% with a few attributes (k=5).
Discussion
Our attack allows an attacker to infer any attribute of a victim using limited background knowledge. We believe this to be a serious vulnerability of Di x's "sticky noise" mechanism. Our main contribution is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel technique to exploit the noise itself as a "signal" for retrieving the victim's private information. We show that calibrating the noise in a way that depends on the dataset leaks information on the dataset itself, and illustrate how one can leverage such leakage to disclose private attributes.
We discuss hereafter two possible limitations in the implementation of our attack, which might lower the accuracy. We also present two methods to generate more sam- ples for the likelihood ratio test which would further improve the accuracy of our attack.
Limitations
First, the queries Q1 and Q2 in equations (3) and (4) might be blocked by the bucket suppression. If the k − 1 attributes in A uniquely identify the victim, it is possible that removing (or negating) a single condition still selects a small set of users, thereby triggering the bucket suppression. As queries are silently suppressed, this would lower the number of samples available for our likelihood ratio test. We however believe the attack to be accurate in a lot of practical settings where enough background information is available to the attacker.
A second potential limitation of our attack comes from correlation between samples. To generate more samples for the likelihood ratio test, we modify Q1 and Q2 by removing (resp. negating) di erent conditions. In principle, we cannot be certain that these samples are all independent, because two di erent queries might have the same exact query set. In that case, the dynamic noise layers associated to the same conditions would have the same values, and hence the total dynamic noises of the two queries would be heavily correlated. While this would a ect the accuracy of our method, we believe this impact to be limited.
Further improvements to the attack
Our noise-exploitation attack relies on a likelihood ratio test with 2k − 2 samples, where k is the number of uniquely identifying attributes. Because we have only limited background information or because too many of our queries are suppressed by bucket suppression, we might want to generate more samples. We could do this in several ways.
Recall that the inference attack ultimately attempts to infer the value of the query in equation (2):
Consider again equation (5) for queries Q1 and Q2. The main property of Q1 and Q2 is Q1(D) − Q2(D) = Q(D). There are many other pairs of queries that satisfy the same requirement and, according to our read of Di x's white papers, will be processed independently:
By an argument similar to the one for Q1 and Q2, we obtain:
As before, we can repeat this test for any condition a i = x i , to obtain 2k − 2 additional samples. Note that, as we add one condition, this adds two independent noises which will not cancel out. We can furthermore repeat the same procedure, inverting the inequalities to obtain 2k − 2 additional samples leading to a total of 6k − 6 samples.
In general, 2k − 2 samples can be obtained from any pair of queries that de ne a partitioning attack for Q; di erent mathematical operators could also be employed to construct such partitions. Such samples will be independent most of the time. One could further exploit Di x's rich SQL syntax by writing conditions with di erent syntax but identical meaning. For example, we could replace every condition "a i = x i " with "a i IN (x i )", and similarly "a i x i " with "a i NOT IN (x i )". Since both static and dynamic noise layers depend on the string that de nes the condition, changing the SQL expression produces independent noise values.
Conclusion
As the historical approach to privacy, data anonymization, has been rendered obsolete by both the availability of background information and the size and uses of modern datasets, the need for alternative solutions is becoming pressing. Di erential privacy has been proposed in 2006 [8] as a strong privacy de nition for query-based systems but has yet to yield an acceptable trade-o between privacy and utility in a general setting such as the one considered here. Research and development of alternative approaches for query-based and questions-and-answers systems, incl. approaches lacking provable guarantees such as Di x's, are, in our opinion, welcome.
As query-based systems become more popular, privacy will increasingly depend on the attack-defense back-and-forth progress we have seen in security, e.g. for the development of secure encryption mechanisms. Patching vulnerabilities in implementations of Di erential Privacy systems or approaches such as Di x's might be an acceptable solution moving forward. This approach, however, requires full transparency on the privacy-preserving techniques being deployed [17] , layered security ensuring that vulnerabilities cannot be quietly exploited undetected, and a community to ensure techniques being deployed are analyzed and new vulnerabilities discovered. Patented and proprietary code closed to public scrutiny-even if externally audited-is unlikely to be su cient to truly help us nd a balance between the great potential of data and the basic human right of privacy.
Appendix A: Likelihood ratio test
Our noise-exploitation attack requires to assess whether the variable follows one distribution or another. This is done using a likelihood ratio test which is the most signi cant test to discriminate between two distributions for a xed false negative rate. Namely, let ∆ = Q1(D) − Q2(D) the variable, which can be distributed according to the normal distributions π 0 = N (1, 2k) or π 1 = N (0, 2), using k − 1 samples δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . , δ k−1 . Each of these sample is obtained using di erent attributes in the queries, and are as-sumed to be independent.
Using the notations introduced earlier, x (s) = 0 if and only if ∆ ∼ π 0 . From independence, the probability of observing the samples if x (s) = 0 is given by:
If x (s) = 1, one nds a similar expression, with π 1 instead of π 0 .
In order to assess whether ∆ follows one distribution or the other, we compute the ratio of these probabilities, as:
If ρ(δ 1 , . . . , δ k−1 ) ≥ t (some threshold t), then it is estimated that x (s) = 0. The threshold can be adapted to set the false negative or false positive rate. In our experiments we set it to 1.
Our attack goes further, as we collect samples from two di erent types of queries, yielding samples δ 1 , . . . , δ k −1 and η 1 , . . . , η k−1 , each according to a di erent distribution of either π 0 or π 1 . The likelihood ratio to test for our attack thus becomes:
Appendix B: Extended attack
In this section, we present an extension of our noise-exploitation attack which addresses two of its known limitations: (1) bucket suppression (3) and (4) and (2) the impossibility for an attacker to know whether a query has been bucket suppressed or not (we assume that suppressed queries output 0). The attacker can, therefore, not know whether the assumptions required for the attack are met for background knowledge x (A) .
To circumvent these issues, this extended attack re nes the original implementation by means of "dummy conditions" which do not impact the user set and remove the need for a likelihood ratio test. It also includes a test subroutine that checks whether the assumptions are met, allowing the attack to self-validate its assumptions. The attack procedure consists of generating subsets of attributes and iteratively applying the test on them until a subset matching the assumptions is found. The inference step of the attack is then performed using these attributes as background knowledge.
Assumptions In the rest of this section, we assume that x is the victim's entire record and the attacker's background information is x (A) = (x (A ) , x (u) ), where A = A ∪ {u} and |A| = k − 1. The goal of the attacker is to infer the victim's secret binary attribute x (s) . We again assume that (x (A ) , x (u) ) uniquely identi es the victim in the dataset. We will later need to assume that the set of users who share all attributes in x (A ) is "large enough" to not be bucket suppressed. This is a weaker assumption compared to the ones of the original implementation: now the assumption will be necessary only for one xed set A , not for all (or, at least, many) subsets of A with one attribute removed.
To simplify the notation, we write a (A ) = x (A ) to indicate the condition that all attributes in A must match the ones in x (A ) , i.e. ∧ a ∈A a = x (a)
In addition, we require the adversary to produce a set of "dummy conditions" {∆ j } 1≤j ≤n D : each ∆ j is an SQL statement such that the set of users matching a (A ) = x (A ) is the same as the set of users matching a (A ) = x (A ) ∧ ∆ j . For instance, the condition a e ≥ 10 is dummy for the query a e = 23. Observe that adding multiple dummy conditions does not a ect the set of matching users.
E ects of rounding While this attack would yield 100% accuracy, we believe that Di x's outputs for counting queries are likely to be capped at zero and rounded to the nearest integer 2 . This would add another protection layer without a ecting utility.
This would a ect our extended attack as one might have that round(r j ) = round(r l ) for j l even if x (s) = 0. Conversely, one may get di erent results if x (s) = 1. We therefore propose a simple modi cation of our attack if rounding/capping is implemented by Di x.
Intuitively, rounding does not have a signi cant e ect on the output, but for low values of k the total variance of the noise when x (s) = 0 is small. Rounding can thus make it harder to distinguish between the two hypotheses. For this reason, instead of adding a single dummy condition ∆ j to the queries for Q j 1 and Q j 2 , we add the conjunction ∧ l j ∆ l :
This modi cation does not impact our previous analysis and increases the total variance of the noise in r j in the x (s) = 0 case. This means that the values in {r j } j ≤n D will be all very similar if x (s) = 1 and uctuate if x (s) = 0. We thus measure the sample variance σ 2 of {r j } j ≤n D , and nd that x (s) = 1 if σ 2 ≤ σ * , and x (s) = 0 otherwise. The cuto threshold σ * can be selected a priori by the attacker through experiments or using the theoretical distributions of the total noise.
Automated assumption validation
The extended attack relies on two assumptions on the attacker's background knowledge (x (A ) , x (u) ):
1. The queries {Q (11) and (12) are not bucket suppressed.
The user is unique in the dataset according to (A , u).
We here show how an attacker knowing a slightly larger set of attributes A * can nd (A , u) ⊆ A * that satisfy the assumptions with high probability. Interestingly, this step employs the attack itself.
From the larger set of attributes, the attacker selects a subset A and a last attribute u (e.g. at random) and applies the two tests below to validate the two assumptions respectively. If both tests succeed, then the attacker can proceed with the actual attack using (A , u) as background knowledge.
Testing for the rst assumption can be easily done by directly submitting the queries {Q j 1 } j ≤n D and {Q j 2 } j ≤n D to Di x. Recall that the threshold for bucket suppression for a query depends only on the corresponding query set. All the queries in {Q j 1 } j ≤n D (resp. 2 We could not nd any mentions of rounding or capping in Di x's white papers [13, 12] . outputs zero, we cannot be sure that it happened because of bucket suppressionlet alone being sure that the bucket contains only the victim. Instead, we propose a "boosting" procedure that employs the attack itself: we run the attack with background knowledge (A , u), using as target attribute (i.e. what the attack seeks to learn) all unused attributes in A * , i.e. the attributes in A * \ (A , u). That is, we iterate the attack, trying to "guess" every attribute that we know of the user that is not already used in the attack. If the attack succeeds for each attribute, then it is very likely that the user is unique according to (A , u). In this case, we consider the test passed, and failed otherwise.
